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Abstract
We show that far from capturing a formally new phenomenon, informational
herding is really a special case of single-person experimentation — and ‘bad herds’
the typical failure of complete learning. We then analyze the analogous team equi-
librium, where individuals maximize the present discounted welfare of posterity. To
do so, we generalize Gittins indices to our non-bandit learning problem, and thereby
characterize when contrarian behaviour arises: (i) While herds are still constrained
efficient, they arise for a strictly smaller belief set. (ii) A log-concave log-likelihood
ratio density robustly ensures that individuals should lean more against their myopic
preference for an action the more popular it becomes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Informational herding has been a subject of much interest for the last fifteen years. The
context is seductively simple: An infinite sequence of individuals must decide on an action
choice from a finite menu. Everyone has identical preferences and actions, and each may
condition his decision both on his endowed private signal about the state of the world, and
on all predecessors’ decisions. But crucially, he cannot see their private signals.
In this setting, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) (BHW) and Banerjee
(1992) showed that a herd eventually arises — eventually, all decision-makers (DMs) make
the same choice, possibly unwise. This simple pathological outcome has understandably
attracted much attention. Clarifying a claim of BHW, we showed in Smith and Sørensen
(2000) (SS) that beliefs converge in the limit upon a cascade set, where only one action
is taken with probability one. SS proved that cascade sets have interior points — and so
bad herds may occur — iff the DMs’ private signals are uniformly bounded in strength.
Efficiency and Herding. This paper attempts a definitive welfare analysis of
the informational herding model. It has often been expressed that herding is a socially
inefficient outcome. We are aware of no general formalization or proof of this intuitive
claim for the original herding setting. For instance, Banerjee loosely justifies the ‘herding
externality’ label by showing that it fails to maximize the long run average of payoffs.
But this weak statistical claim quite restrictively demands that no weight be placed on
current payoffs.1 Moreover, deducing the efficient solution for this simple payoff objective
is problematic: Banerjee’s proposed remedy for the externality is simply to exclude early
individuals from viewing others’ actions at all. We are able to characterize efficient forward-
looking behaviour, shedding light on the informational herding externality. We contrast
behaviour in the selfish or myopic herding equilibrium, and the team equilibrium (Radner
1962), where everyone maximizes the present discounted welfare of individuals.
The overarching thesis that we formalize and prove is that it is efficient for individuals
to behave in a contrarian fashion. By this, we suggestively mean that they should skew
their choices towards the less popular actions, so that their actions will better reflect their
private information. We have found two different manifestations of this principle.
First, in the long-run, the belief cascade sets — namely, public beliefs where all further
1Vives (1993) introduces a repeated market setting, in which many agents period-by-period come to
reveal their original private information through noisy observations. Vives (1997) studies the team problem
in this setting, where every agent takes into account that more aggressive trading helps to reveal useful
information to the other agents. We adopt here an analogous approach to the herding model.
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learning stops — are smaller. For we show that in the team equilibrium, cascade sets
monotonically strictly shrink as the discount factor rises. Only in the extreme patience
limit are incorrect herds impossible. But we also establish a limit to contrarian behaviour.
While incorrect herds might be seen as a market failure, they are in fact constrained-
efficient: Cascade sets only vanish as the discount factor tends to one: Even when DMs
are very patient, weighting immediate gains very little, informational herds arise in the
team equilibrium; with bounded private beliefs, such herds are misguided (ex post) with
positive chance. So herding owes to the inability of individuals to signal private information
by finitely many actions, and not to their selfishness.
Second, in the major result of this paper, we analyze behavior in the short run — that
is, at any finite stage before the limit. There we must formalize a notion of contrarianism
at the margin: The more the weight of history favours taking an action, the more likely an
informed DM should lean against taking it. This marginal penalty for ‘popular’ actions
is optimal only under a plausible new informational assumption: The unconditional signal
distribution must have a log-concave density of the log-likelihood ratio. We believe that
this is the first use of log-concavity in the experimentation or herding literatures.
Analyzing behaviour away from the limit in a discrete time dynamic optimization model
is well-known to be hard. A famous exception is Gittins’ (1979) multi-armed bandit indices,
where the optimal decision rule is to choose the action with the highest index. In another
key contribution of this paper, we have modified his methodology for our setting. So unlike
Gittins’ perfect information context, an action’s index is not simply its present discounted
social value. Rather, individuals’ signals are hidden from view, and so social rewards
must be translated into private incentives using the marginal social value, to produce
the privately estimated social value of each action. Our contrarianism comparative static
succeeds by showing that the difference of consecutive indices, which measures the marginal
return to a higher posterior threshold, is monotonic in public beliefs. We have also used
this new result throughout the analysis as a simplifying tool. For instance, it affords an
easy proof of the optimality of belief interval rules.
Experimentation De´ja` Vu. This paper was sparked by a simple question about
informational herding: Haven’t we seen this before? We were piqued by its similarity to
the familiar failure of complete learning in optimal experimentation. Rothschild’s (1974)
analysis of the two-armed bandit is a classic example: An impatient monopolist optimally
experiments with two possible prices each period, with fixed uncertain purchase chances
for each price. Rothschild showed that the monopolist (i) eventually settles down on one
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price, and (ii) selects the less profitable price with positive probability. To us, this had
the clear ring of: (i) an action herd occurs, and (ii) with positive chance is misguided.
This paper begins by formally justifying this intuitive link. We prove that informational
herding is not a new phenomenon, but a camouflaged context for this old one: single
person experimentation, with possible incomplete learning. Our proof respects the herding
paradigm quintessence that predecessors’ signals be hidden from view. In a nutshell, we
replace all DMs by agent machines that automatically map any realized private signals
into action choices; the true experimenter then must furnish these automata with optimal
history-contingent ‘decision rules’. We therefore reinterpret actions in the herding model as
the experimenter’s stochastic signals, and the DMs’ decision rules as his allowed actions.
We perform this formal embedding for a general observational learning context. This
experimentation embedding is crucial for setting up our planner’s problem.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a general observational learning
model, and then re-interprets it as an optimal single-person experimentation model. The
herding model and team equilibrium are introduced in section 3, where our action indices
are introduced. We then describe optimal strategies using index rules, and prove our short-
run contrarian result in section 4. The long-run model is considered in section 5; there we
show the cascade sets are non-empty, and that they shrink with the discount factor. A
conclusion follows, while many proofs are appendicized.
2 TWO EQUIVALENT LEARNING MODELS
In this section, we first set up a general observational learning model subsuming the herding
models. All models in this class are then formally embedded in the experimentation
framework. Afterwards, we specialize our findings to the informational herding model.
2.1 The Observational Learning Model
Information. An infinite sequence of decision-makers (DMs) n = 1, 2, . . . acts in
that exogenous order. The actions have uncertain payoffs. There is a given common prior
belief over the compact space Ω, whose elements ω are the states of the world.
The nth DM observes a partially informative random private signal realization σn
about the state of the world. We may assume WLOG that the private signal observed
by a DM is actually his private belief which results from Bayesian updating given σn
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and the prior;2 that is, σn ∈ Σ, where Σ = ∆(Ω) consists of probability measures over Ω.
Conditional on the state, the signals are assumed to be i.i.d. across DMs, drawn according
to the probability measure µω ∈ ∆(Σ) in state ω ∈ Ω.
Bayesian Decision-Making. Everyone chooses from a compact action set A.
Action a ∈ A earns a payoff u(a, ω) in state ω ∈ Ω, the same for all DMs. Before choosing
an action, the n’th DM first observes his private signal/belief and the history consisting
of the n− 1 predecessors’ actions.
Each DM’s Bayes-optimal decision uses the observed action history and his own private
belief. A DM can compute the strategies of all predecessors, and can use the common
prior to calculate the ex ante probability distribution over histories in either state. Bayes’
rule then implies a public belief pi ∈ Σ for any history. A final application of Bayes’ rule
incorporates the private belief σ to give the private posterior belief ρ ∈ Σ.
Given the posterior belief ρ, the DM picks the action a ∈ A which maximizes his
expected payoff u¯(a, ρ) =
∫
Ω
u(a, ω)dρ(ω). Let X be the space of decision rules — namely,
maps x from Σ into ∆(A), the probability measures x(σ) over A. Any rule x ∈ X induces
a distribution over actions for all private beliefs σ.
The Stochastic Process of Beliefs. The distribution of signals σ depends on
the state ω, so that the distribution over actions a depends on both the state ω and the
decision rule x. There is a density ψ(ω, x) ≡ ∫ x(σ)(a)µω(dσ); unconditional on the state,
it is ψ(pi, x) ≡ ∫
Ω
ψ(ω, x)pi(dω). This yields a distribution over next period public beliefs.
Thus, 〈pin〉 follows a Markov process with state-dependent transition chances.
2.2 Informational Herding as Experimentation De´ja` Vu
And out of old bookes, in good faithe,
Cometh al this new science that men lere.
— Geoffrey Chaucer (The Assembly of Fowles, line 22)
Our immediate goal is to recast the observational problem outcome as a single person
optimization. A first stab brings us to the forgetful experimenter, who each period receives
a new informative signal, takes an optimal action, and then promptly forgets his signal;
the next period, he can reflect only on his action choice. But this is not a model of Bayes-
optimal experimentation, since it assumes and in fact requires irrational behaviour. How
then can an experimenter not observe the private signals, and yet take informative actions?
2Hereafter, we therefore often use private belief and private signal interchangeably.
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For context, consider McLennan’s (1984) sequel to Rothschild (1974). He allowed
the monopolist to charge one of a continuum of prices, with two possible linear purchase
chance ‘demand curves’. McLennan found that the resulting uninformative price when the
demand curves crossed may well eventually be chosen by an optimizing monopolist.
Rothschild’s and McLennan’s models give examples of potentially confounding actions,
later introduced in EK: Easley and Kiefer (1988). In brief, such actions are optimal for
unfocused beliefs for which they are invariants (i.e. taking the action leaves the beliefs
unchanged). Of particular significance is the proof in EK (on page 1059) that with finite
state and action spaces, potentially confounding actions generically do not exist, and
thus complete learning must arise.3 Rothschild and McLennan might be seen as separate
anticipations of EK’s general insight. Rothschild escapes it by means of a continuous
state space, whereas McLennan resorts to a continuous action space. Yet there appears
no escape for the herding paradigm, where both flavours of incomplete learning, incorrect
limit cascades and confounded learning (see SS), generically arise with two actions and
two states. This puzzle suggests the inverse mapping that we now consider.
In recasting our general observational learning model as a single person experimentation
problem, we must focus on the myopic experimenter with discount factor 0 (ruling out
active experimentation). Steering away from a forgetful experimenter, we shall regard
the observational learning story from a new perspective. Consider the nth DM, who uses
both the public belief pin and his private signal σn in forming and acting upon his posterior
beliefs ρn. We may separate these two steps by the conditional independence of pin and σn.
Regard Mr. n as: (i) observing pin, but not his private signal; (ii) optimally determining
the rule x ∈ X, and submitting it to an agent ‘choice’ machine; and (iii) letting that
machine observe his private signal and take his action a ∈ A for him. The payoff u(a, ω)
is unobserved, lest that provide an additional signal of the state of the world.
Thus, the observational learning model corresponds to a single-person experimentation
model where: The state space is Ω. At stage n, the experimenter EX chooses an action
(the rule) x ∈ X. Given this choice, a random observable statistic a ∈ A is realized with
chance ψ(ω, x) in state ω. Finally, the period’s payoff u(a, ω) is realized but not observed.4
When private beliefs σ have distribution µω in state ω, and when EX fully disounts future
payoffs, then he chooses the same optimal decision rule x described in section 2, resulting in
3Eg: payoffs in a one-armed bandit, with a potentially confounding safe arm, are not generic in R2.
4This model doesn’t strictly fit into the EK mold, where stage payoffs depend only on the action and
the observed signal, but (unlike here) not on the parameter ω ∈ Ω. This is the structure of Aghion, Bolton,
Harris, and Jullien (1991), who admit unobserved payoffs. Alternatively, we could posit that EX has fair
insurance, and only sees/earns his expected payoff each period and not his random realized payoff.
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Observational Learning Model Impatient Experimenter Model
State: ω ∈ Ω State: ω ∈ Ω
Public Belief after nth DM: pin Belief after n observations: pin
Optimal decision rule: x ∈ X Optimal action: x ∈ X
Private signal/belief of nth DM: σn Randomness in the nth experiment: σn
Action taken by each DM: a ∈ A Observable signals: a ∈ A
Density over actions: ψ(ω, x) Density over observables: ψ(ω, x)
Payoffs: private information Payoffs: unobserved
Table 1: Embedding. This table displays how our infinite person observational learning
model fits into the impatient single person experimentation model.
action a ∈ A with chance ψ(ω, x). Table 1 summarizes this embedding of the observational
learning model into a myopic experimentation model.
Notice how this addresses both lead puzzles. First, the experimenter never knows the
private beliefs σ, and thus does not forget them. Second, incomplete learning (bad herds)
are entirely consistent with EK’s generic finding of complete learning for models with finite
action and state spaces. Simply put, actions do not map to actions but to signals when one
rewrites the observational learning model as an experimentation model. The true action
space for EX is the infinite space X of decision rules.5
3 FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATIONAL HERDING
3.1 Two Forward-Looking Informational Herding Models
We now specialize to the simpler informational herding framework, following SS, with two
states and exactly A <∞ actions. We assume that action 1 is best in state L, and action
A in state H . No two action payoffs are tied in either state.
This observational learning paradigm involves an informational externality, because
taking an action partially conveys one’s hidden private signal. The individuals jointly
possess enough information to perfectly reveal the true state of the world, yet given the
sequential structure, do not. SS prove that with bounded private beliefs, the resulting
5Such an embedding is well-known and obvious for rational expectations pricing models, since the price
is publicly observed, and an inverse mapping is not required.
SS considered two modifications of the informational herding paradigm. With i.i.d. ‘crazy’ preference
types, one adds an exogenous chance of a noisy signal (i.e. random action). With individuals randomly
drawn from one of T different preference types, let the EX choose a T -vector of optimal decision rules
from XT with (only) the choice machine seeing the task and private belief, and choosing the action a.
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herding equilibrium is sometimes ex post inefficient. But is this ex ante inefficient, subject
to the sequential structure, and hidden signal assumption? To address this question, we
consider alternative objectives, where everyone is altruistic, and aims to maximize an
discounted average of payoffs. Adapting Radner (1962), we call an equilibrium in this
revised model a team equilibrium. We underscore however that individuals’ preferences
are not perfectly aligned as in Radner, since they still weight their own payoffs highest.
Assume a state space Ω = {H,L}, with both states equi-likely ex ante (prior chance 1/2).
Private belief σ is the chance of state H , so that Σ = [0, 1]. To avoid trivialities, µH and
µL are not (a.s.) identical, so that some signals are informative. Each distribution may
contain atoms, but to ensure that no signal will perfectly reveal the state of the world,
we insist that µH and µL be mutually absolutely continuous. Let supp(µ) denote their
common support. If supp(µ) ⊆ (0, 1), then private beliefs are bounded ; they are unbounded
if co(supp(µ)) = [0, 1] — namely, if arbitrarily strong private beliefs exist.
Given the equi-likely states, the unconditional distribution of private beliefs is described
by the probability measure µ = (µH + µL)/2. The derivative dµL/dµH of beliefs in the
two states is well-defined and finite, by mutual absolute continuity. The ‘no introspection’
property of SS asserts (dµL/dµH)(σ) = (1 − σ)/σ, so that dµH/dµ = 2σ and dµL/dµ =
2(1− σ). We can thus take µ to be the primitive distribution of the private signal, from
which the state-dependent probability measures µH and µL are derived.
The Team Equilibrium. We first suppose that every DM is altruistic, but subject to
the informational herding restriction. A strategy sn for the n’th DM is a map from history
to X, assigning the rule xn ∈ X for each history; s = (s1, s2, . . .) denotes a strategy profile.
A team equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game where the nth DMmaximizes
the average present welfare of posterity, themselves included E[(1− δ)∑∞k=0 δkun+k|pin].
The Social Optimum. We next reinterpret EX ’s problem as that of an informationally
constrained social optimum: Maximize the average present value of posterity’s welfare
E[(1− δ)∑∞n=1 δn−1un]. Here, the realized payoff sequence is 〈un〉 for DM’s n = 1, 2, . . ..
So the EX ’s objectives are perfectly aligned with a hypothetical social planner. To respect
the herding restriction, we assume that the planner neither knows the state nor can observe
the individuals’ private signals, but can both observe and induce any actions taken.
A policy is the Markovian restriction of a strategy: a map ξ : [0, 1] → X, where ξ(pi)
is the rule given belief pi. If the social optimum exists, then there exists a policy which
attains the maximum, since the problem is Markovian in public beliefs pi, via Bayes rule.
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The Second Welfare Theorem. Inspired by Vives (1997), we now briefly recast an
insight of Radner (1962) for our framework.
Lemma 1 For any discount factor δ < 1, any social optimum is a team equilibrium.
Further, the most efficient team equilibrium is described by a Markov policy.
Proof: As the planner can use any team equilibrium strategy, the second claim follows
from the first. So fix the current DM and public belief pi. To see that the planner’s
optimum s is a team equilibrium, assume that successors use it, but that some DM n has
a strictly better reply xˆ. Then the planner can improve his value at pi by fully mimicking
this deviation, i.e. by (i) taking xˆ in the first period and (ii) continuing with s as if the first
period history had been generated by sn(pi). This contradicts optimality of the policy. 
3.2 Optimal Behaviour via Index Rules
Dynamic Programming. Our analysis here follows Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien
(1991) and §9.1–2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). The value function vδ(·) : Σ 7→ R for the
planning problem with discount factor δ is vδ(pi) = supsE[(1 − δ)
∑
∞
n=1 δ
n−1un|pi], where
the expectation is over the payoff sequences given the strategy profile s. Recall that u¯(a, pi)
denotes the expected payoff from action a at belief pi. Define ψ(ω, x) =
∫
x(σ)(a)µω(dσ)
for ω = L,H , and put ψ(pi, x) = piψ(H, x) + (1 − pi)ψ(L, x), in a suggestive abuse of
notation. If q(a, pi, x) = piψ(H, x)/ψ(pi, x) is the Bayes-updated posterior belief from pi
when action a is observed and rule x is applied, we may formulate the Bellman equation:
vδ(pi) = sup
x∈X
{∑
a∈A
ψ(pi, x) [(1− δ)u¯(a, q(a, pi, x)) + δvδ(q(a, pi, x))]
}
(1)
A unique solution vδ to the Bellman equation exists, and it is convex and continuous in pi.
Generalized Gittins Indices. We now consider the classical multi-armed bandit (see
Bertsekas (1987), §6.5). A patient experimenter each period must choose one of n actions,
with uncertain independent reward distributions. He must then trade-off the informa-
tional and myopic payoffs associated with each action. Gittins (1979) showed that optimal
behaviour in that model can be described by simple index rules: Attach to each action the
value of the problem with just that action and the largest possible lump sum retirement
reward yielding indifference. Then, each period, choose the action with the highest index.
We now argue that the policy employed in a team equilibrium has a likewise appealing
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form: For a given public belief pi and posterior ρ, the DM chooses the action a with the
largest index. This index will include the social payoff as privately estimated by the DM.
Below, we employ the standard notation ∂g(z) for the subdifferential of the convex
function g at z — i.e., the set of all slopes m that obey g(zˆ) ≥ g(z) +m · (zˆ − z) for all zˆ.
Proposition 1 (The Index Rule) Fix a team equilibrium s, and a decision maker n
who has arrived at prior belief pi. To each action a ∈ A, there exists a function v¯(a, pi, ρ),
affine in n’s private posterior belief ρ, such that n’s average present value of action a is
wδ(a, pi, ρ) = (1− δ)u¯(a, ρ) + δv¯(a, pi, ρ) (2)
where q(a) ≡ q(a, pi, sn(pi)) is the public posterior belief induced by action a. Moreover, in
the social optimum, v¯(a, pi, ρ) = vδ(q(a)) +m(a, pi)(ρ− q(a)) where m(a, pi) ∈ ∂vδ(q(a)).
Proof: Action a of n at prior pi leads to a subgame where the state-contingent expected
discounted future payoffs of his successors are v¯(L) and v¯(H). Then n’s expected value
of this subgame is v¯(a, pi, ρ) ≡ ρv¯(H) + (1 − ρ)v¯(L). The present value expression (2)
follows. In the social optimum, the continuation value is v¯(a, pi, q(a)) = vδ(q(a)). Because
the planner can always employ the same subgame strategy starting at an arbitrary public
belief q as is optimal at q(a), we have v¯(a, pi, q) ≤ vδ(q). Thus, the slope of this affine
function necessarily lies in the subdifferential ∂vδ(q(a)). 
That the planner can always ensure himself a payoff function tangent to the value
function by simply not adjusting his policy was critical to this proof. This idea also
implies convexity of the value function (Lemma 2 of Fusselman and Mirman (1993)).
3.3 Optimal Action Belief Interval Rules
SS shows that the myopic DM uses a belief interval rule: Action a is taken for beliefs in
a subinterval of [0, 1], and for generic payoffs, these intervals overlap only at endpoints.
This is also true with patience, as Lemma 2 proves.
Lemma 2 Fix any team equilibrium strategy s. For any public belief pi, the rule sn(pi) is
almost surely described by a dissection of [0, 1] into closed intervals Ia(pi) ≡ I¯a, generically
overlapping at endpoints only, such that action a is optimal iff σ ∈ Ia.
Proof: By Proposition 1, the value of each action depends affinely on the posterior r(pi, σ).
Thus, an action is optimal for r(pi, σ) in an interval. Since r is increasing in its second
argument, an action is optimal on an interval for σ. 
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Intuitively, the interval structure is not only myopically best, but it also ensures the
greatest information value, by producing the riskiest posterior belief distribution.
By Lemma 1, the planner’s solution too is described by the interval rules of Lemma 2.
So the search for optimal rules can be narrowed down to a compact set. An optimal
rule then exists (eg. Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien (1991), Theorem 4.1), and so by
Lemma 1, a team equilibrium also exists. The appendix also establishes part (b) below:
Lemma 3 (a) A social planner’s policy ξδ : [0, 1]→ X and team equilibrium both exist.
(b) The correspondence pi 7→ ξδ(pi) is upper hemi-continuous in pi.
Communicating private information by a finite mesh size is a problem that is not
without history. Sobel (1953) investigated an interval structure in a simple statistical
decision problem. More recently, Dow (1991) has also studied the nature of such a coarse
information process in a two period search model. A consumer first observes one signal
σ1 ∈ R, but can remember in the future only whether σ1 ∈ Ei, for an endogenous coarse
partition E1, . . . , En of R. In the second period, the consumer observes σ2 ∈ R, and then
chooses an action a ∈ {1, 2} to maximize the expected payoff given Ei and σ2. Since no
decision is made in the first period, this corresponds to δ = 1 for us. Like us, Dow shows
that the DM communicates to his future selves with connected intervals of signals.6
We first characterize the cascade sets, the belief regions where learning stops.
Lemma 4 (a) An optimal policy almost surely induces action a iff pi ∈ Ja(δ), where
Ja(δ)⊂ [0, 1] is empty, a point, or an interval.
(b) 0∈J1(δ) and 1∈JA(δ) for any δ∈ [0, 1), and ∪Aa=1Ja(δ) 6= [0, 1].
Proof: It is optimal to induce any action a almost surely iff vδ(pi) = u¯(a, pi). As u¯(a, pi)
is affine in pi, and vδ(·) is weakly convex, this equality holds on a closed interval Ja(δ).
Also, action 1 is myopically strictly optimal when pi = 0. Since it updates to continuation
belief pi = 0 for any rule, it is also dynamically optimal for any discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
A similar proof holds for pi = 1. Finally, if ∪Aa=1Ja(δ) = [0, 1], then vδ(pi) = maxa u¯(a, pi) is
piecewise linear, and information has no value. This is impossible at any kink of vδ(pi).
Interval Ordering. Lemma 2 does not say that intervals are arranged in the myopic
order. For while swapping the interval order preserves the informational content of the
actions, it might entail a myopic loss. Eg., let action 2 be slightly better than action 1
6Chernoff (1952) interprets hypothesis acceptance or rejection as a bi-partition of the available infor-
mation, and he studies the optimal such partition. Again, when δ < 1 our problem is more complex.
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Figure 1: Action ordering. The unconditional private belief density is f(σ) = Kσ6 over
the range (0, 4/7), where K = 78/47, with mean belief 1/2. Action a = 1, 2 has payoff a
in state H and 3− a in state L. The myopic (δ = 0) basin for action 1 is (0, 3/7). When
δ = .95, the graph shows the individual’s posterior belief y against his prior belief pi at the
threshold x(pi). The basin for action 1 now shrinks to [0, .3). For pi ∈ (.3, .4) ⊂ (0, 3/7),
reversing the action order is optimal: the myopically optimal action 1 is taken at high
beliefs, while the myopically worse action 2 is taken at the less likely low private beliefs.
in state H , but much worse in state L. Consider the policy that takes action 1 for all
but very low beliefs. Then swapping the intervals raises the chance that the mostly worse
action 2 is taken, and so might be suboptimal. Figure 1 illustrates this possibility.
Dominated Actions. Lemma 2 also does not rule out using dominated actions for more
information is transmitted with more actions. To see this, assume A actions, discount
factor δ > 0, and bounded beliefs. Since action A is uniquely optimal in state H , this
remains true for any public belief pi in the interior of the cascade set JA = [p¯i, 1]. The
associated value function v is then affine on JA, but not on any interval extending JA
to the left — i.e. it is strictly convex at p¯i. Now add an extra action A + 1 with payoff
u(A + 1, ω) = u(A, ω) − ε, for all states ω, where ε > 0. Even though A + 1 is strictly
dominated by A, we argue that A+1 is used with positive chance for small enough ε > 0.
If action A + 1 is never used, then v remains the value function of the new problem.
One optimal policy at p¯i is then to take A almost surely. Instead map private signals below
1/2 into A, and above 1/2 into A + 1. This strictly spreads the posterior beliefs when
qA < p¯i < qA+1. Since the value function is strictly convex at p¯i, the expected continuation
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value exceeds v(p¯i) by some η > 0. On the other hand, the policy change implies a myopic
loss less than ε. When δη − (1− δ)ε > 0, the modified policy beats the optimal policy —
a contradiction. But then v cannot be the value function of the modified problem, and so
the new action A+ 1 must be used with positive chance.
Optimal Taxes? Lemma 2 ignores implementation. The team equilibrium assumes
everyone cares about posterity. Can the planner’s outcome be decentralized with selfish
individuals? Since the only observables are actions, action-dependent transfer payments
are the only available policy instrument — assuming that only contemporaneous actions
are rewarded/punished. Suppose that everyone maximizes his expected one-shot myopic
payoff u(a, pi) plus incurred transfers. Faced with any such incentives, our proof of Lemma 2
that interval rules are optimal is still valid, since our indices affinely adjust. But since such
transfers can never reverse the myopic ordering of actions, and so are not sufficient if the
optimal action ordering differs from the optimal action ordering. We leave as an open
whether sufficient conditions exist for which transfers decentralize the planner’s solution.
Below, we explore how patience affects the informational herding problem. Section 4
derives a novel comparative static valid at any public belief, showing how individuals lean
against the conventional wisdom when δ > 0. Section 5 then shows how cascade sets
shrink as individuals grow more patient.
4 THE SHORT RUN COMPARATIVE STATIC
4.1 Two Actions
We now derive a local comparative statics result. For clarity, we first simply assume two
actions: a low action ` taken at low beliefs and a high action h, taken at high beliefs.
While it seems intuitive that action ` is myopically best for low beliefs and action h for
high beliefs, this intuition is misleading (see Figure 1). This is a local notion, and in
principle the low and high actions could depend on the public belief pi.
By Lemma 4, both actions are taken with positive probability when pi is in the open
non-empty interval M=[0, 1] \ (J`(δ) ∪ Jh(δ)). We first rule out an annoying possibility.
A-1 A unique rule x(pi) is optimal in some open neighbourhood N(p¯i) ⊆M of p¯i.
Our decision rule x implies a private belief threshold θ, separating the belief intervals
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for the two actions. The action ordering cannot switch in the open neighbourhood N(p¯i).7
The public, private, and posterior beliefs pi, σ, and ρ are related by the monotone maps:
ρ = r(pi, σ) ≡ piσ
piσ + (1− pi)(1− σ) ⇔ σ =
(1− pi)ρ
(1− pi)ρ+ pi(1− ρ) = r(1− pi, ρ)
The rule x is thus locally summarized by the posterior belief threshold y ≡ r(pi, θ).
Clearly, in the myopic case when δ = 0, the optimal posterior threshold y(pi) between
the intervals of private posterior beliefs for actions ` and h is constant in pi. We provide
conditions under which the best team policy at δ > 0 encourages contrarian behaviour
relative to the myopic policy. (We fix δ > 0, and so suppress the δ superscript.) Specifically
we prove that y(pi) increases in pi. So for higher public beliefs pi, the DM is discouraged
from choosing the increasingly popular action h versus `. This experimentation benefits
successors, since the less likely action moves public beliefs more.
A critical hurdle that must be overcome is the following: It is natural to suppose, and
crucial for the argument, that the posterior public belief following each action is monotone
in the prior. Recall that actions constitute a discrete filter on the underlying signals. Thus,
such a public posterior is an average of unobserved private posteriors that could lead to the
action. Action ` (or h) is taken whenever such a private posterior falls below (or above)
a threshold. Thus, we require monotonicity of a truncated random variable. In the spirit
of Burdett (1996), we find that a log-concavity assumption is the missing ingredient.
Let f be the unconditional private belief density for µ. The private belief log-likelihood
ratio Λ(σ)=log(σ/(1−σ)) then has density φ(Λ) ≡ f(σ(Λ))σ′(Λ) = f(σ(Λ))eΛ/(1 + eΛ)2.
A-2 The log-likelihood ratio density φ(Λ) exists, and is strictly log-concave.
Proposition 2 (Contrarianism) Assume p¯i ∈ M and δ > 0. Under A-1 and A-2,
contrarian behaviour is encouraged: the threshold y(pi) strictly increases in pi ∈ N(p¯i).
Proof: The proof exploits the first order condition and the value function convexity.
It works even when v is not globally differentiable,8 because differentiability obtains at
precisely those points where it is required. In light of (1), and our assumed action order,
7Indeed, local uniqueness and a uhc rule correspondence precludes policy jumps, and thus in particular,
any switch between h = 2 and h = 1. This can be seen, eg., using the metric introduced proof of Lemma 3.
8Differentiability of the value function in problems of learning is an open problem. We thank Rabah
Amir, David Easley, Andrew McLennan, Paul Milgrom, Len Mirman, Yaw Nyarko, and Ed Schlee for
discussions about the differentiability of the value function in experimentation problems. Amir (1996)
establishes differentiability at all continuation states in a deterministic problem.
13
the maximand of the Bellman equation in this two action world is
B(pi, y) = ψ(pi, y)[(1− δ)u¯`(q`) + δv(q`)] + (1− ψ(pi, y))[(1− δ)u¯h(qh) + δv(qh)] (3)
where9 u¯a(y) = u¯(a, y), ψ(pi, y) = ψ(`, pi, y), and q` = q(`, pi, y) < y < qh = q(h, pi, y).
Step 1 (First Order Condition) If y solves maxy B(pi, y), then the value function v
is differentiable at the continuation beliefs qa after actions a = 1, 2. Moreover,
By(pi, y)=
∂ψ
∂y
{(1−δ)u¯`(y)+δ[v(q`)+v′(q`)(y−q`)]−(1−δ)u¯h(y)−δ[v(qh)+v′(qh)(y−qh)]} (4)
Proof: If we assume first that v is differentiable at q` and qh, then By(pi, y) equals
∂ψ
∂y
((1− δ)u¯`(q`) + δv(q`)) + ψ
(
(1− δ)∂u¯`(q`)
∂q`
∂q`
∂y
+ δv′(q`)
∂q`
∂y
)
−∂ψ
∂y
((1− δ)u¯h(qh) + δv(qh)) + (1− ψ)
(
(1− δ)∂u¯h(qh)
∂qh
∂qh
∂y
+ δv′(qh)
∂qh
∂y
)
Recalling that u¯` and u¯h are affine functions, and using Lemma 5 below, this produces (4).
If v is not differentiable at q` or qh or both, then its right derivative strictly exceeds
its left — i.e. a ‘convex kink’. Since q` and qh are increasing functions of y, and since
∂ψ/∂y > 0 and q` < y < qh, (4) applies to one-sided derivatives — in other words,
By−(pi, y) < By+(pi, y). But optimality of y implies that the left derivative is nonnegative,
and the right derivative nonpositive. The convex kink cannot then obtain. 
Lemma 5 (y − q1)∂ψ/∂y = ψ∂q1/∂y and (q2 − y)∂ψ/∂y = (1− ψ)∂qh/∂y.
The lemma admits a simple intuition. Observe that y and qa are the marginal and
average private beliefs leading to action a, while ψa is the total chance of taking a. Think of
these as a firm’s marginal costMC, average cost AC, and quantityQ. Then (ρ−q)∂ψ/∂ρ =
ψ∂q/∂ρ reduces to the producer theory result that (MC − AC)/q = AC ′(q).
The first order condition in Step 1 is related to our index result of Proposition 1. Since
∂ψ/∂y > 0, the first order condition says that the indices coincide at knife-edge beliefs:
wδ(`, pi, y) = wδ(h, pi, y). This could also be rewritten as the equality at belief y of a myopic
gain and a dynamic loss from a marginal shift in the threshold belief (see Figure 2):
(1− δ) [u¯`(y)− u¯h(y)] = δ [(v(qh) + v′(qh)(y − qh))− (v(q`) + v′(q`)(y − q`))] (5)
9As the policy rule x is equivalently represented by posterior threshold y, this proof replaces the
function qa(pi, x) with qa(pi, y).
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0 q` y qh 1
u¯`(1)
τ(1, q`)
τ(1, qh)
u¯h(1) = v(1)
u¯`(0) = v(0)
τ(0, q`)
τ(0, qh)
Figure 2: First order condition. The convex curve is the value function v as a function
of beliefs. It intersects the myopic value functions at 0 and 1. Given the threshold posterior
belief y, we show the tangents to v at posteriors q`, qh. The vertical arrows over y indicate
the myopic loss and dynamic gain from a marginal change in y. The first order condition
states that the lengths of these arrows stand in proportion δ/(1− δ).
When n = 2, the first agent’s decision merely conveys to the second agent whether the
belief ρ is above or below the threshold y. From (5) it follows that the optimal threshold
lies at the intersection of the two tangents.10
Let us now turn to the comparative static exercise. By Lemma 6 below, the public
posteriors q`, qh are increasing in the public prior belief pi. Next, by Lemmas 7 and 8 (as
in Figure 2), the RHS of (5) is falling in each of q`, qh, and thus pi, by the convexity of the
value function. This yields a sufficient condition for an increasing optimizer y(pi).
Step 2 (Single-Crossing Property) For all pi, pi′ ∈ N(p¯i) with pi < pi′: (a) the function
B(pi, y) obeys the single crossing property By−(pi
′, y(pi)) > 0, and so (b) y(pi′) > y(pi).
Proof: For (a), rewrite By−(pi, y) = Υ(y, q`(pi, y), qh(pi, y))∂ψ(pi, y)/∂y, where
Υ(y, q`, qh) ≡ (1− δ)[u¯`(y)− u¯h(y)] + δ[τ(y, q`)− τ(y, qh)]
and where τ(y, q) ≡ v(q) + v′(q−)(y − q) is the affine function left-tangent to v at q.
10Our result generalizes Dow’s Proposition 2, which relies on the perfect patience as well as a particularly
simple second-period value function. We note in passing that Dow’s Example 3 illustrates the multiplicity
of optimal solutions which can arise in this class of problems.
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Since By−(pi, y(pi)) = 0, we have By−(pi
′, y(pi)) > 0 iff
Υ(y(pi), q`(pi
′, y(pi)), qh(pi
′, y(pi))) > Υ(y(pi), q`(pi, y(pi)), qh(pi, y(pi)))
Since only the continuation beliefs change, this is equivalent to
τ(y(pi), q`(pi
′, y(pi)))− τ(y(pi), qh(pi′, y(pi))) > τ(y(pi), q`(pi, y(pi)))− τ(y(pi), qh(pi, y(pi)))
When pi < pi′, we have q`(pi, y(pi)) < q`(pi
′, y(pi)) < y(pi) < qh(pi, y(pi)) < qh(pi
′, y(pi)) by
Lemma 6. From Lemmas 7 and 8, we find that τ(y(pi), qh(pi, y(pi))) ≥ τ(y(pi), qh(pi′, y(pi)))
and τ(y(pi), q`(pi
′, y(pi))) ≥ τ(y(pi), q`(pi, y(pi))). Also, at least one inequality is strict since
some continuation belief qa lies inside M , by Claim 10. This proves the needed inequality.
For (b), suppose first that y(pi′) = y(pi). Then By−(pi
′, y(pi′)) = By−(pi
′, y(pi)) > 0
by (a), contradicting the optimality of y(pi′). Or suppose that y(pi′) < y(pi). In this case,
by a variant of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus for convex functions (see Claim 1),
B(pi′, y(pi))− B(pi′, y(pi′)) = ∫ y(pi)
y(pi′)
By−(pi
′, z)dz
Since the optimizer y(pi) is unique, the u.h.c. map pi 7→ y(pi) is also continuous. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, for all z ∈ (y(pi′), y(pi)), there then exists pi′′ ∈ (pi, pi′) with
y(pi′′) = z. Thus, by part (a), the above integrand By−(pi
′, z) = By−(pi
′, y(pi′′)) > 0, and
so B(pi′, y(pi)) > B(pi′, y(pi′)). This contradicts optimality of y(pi′). 
The next step provides conditions for the posterior belief after any action a to increase
in the public belief pi. While at first glance intuitive, it is generally violated by the standard
atomic signal distributions. The log-concavity assumption comes crucially into play here.
Lemma 6 For fixed y, the continuation public belief qa(pi, y) is strictly increasing in pi.
Proof: Let θ(pi) solve y = r(pi, θ). Since an increase in q`(pi, y) is equivalent to an increase
in q`(pi, y)/[1− q`(pi, y)], we need only show the latter rises in y. Now,
q`(pi, y)
1− q`(pi, y) =
(
pi
1− pi
) ∫ θ(pi)
0
fH(σ)dσ∫ θ(pi)
0
fL(σ)dσ
=
(
pi
1− pi
) ∫ θ(pi)
0
σ f(σ)dσ∫ θ(pi)
0
(1− σ) f(σ)dσ
(6)
given densities fH(σ) = 2σf(σ) and fL(σ) = 2(1 − σ)f(σ) for the measures µH and µL.
Changing densities via the posterior likelihood ratio λ = piσ/[(1− pi)(1− σ)], we find (see
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§A.6) that (1− pi)(1− σ)f(σ)dσ = g(pi, λ)dλ and piσf(σ)dσ = λg(pi, λ)dλ for the function
g(pi, λ) =
pi(1− pi)φ(Λ(σ(λ)))
(pi + λ(1− pi))λ
given our density φ(Λ) = f(σ(Λ))eΛ/(1 + eΛ)2. This allows us to rewrite (6) as:
q`(pi, y)
1− q`(pi, y) =
∫ y/(1−y)
0
λg(pi, λ) dλ∫ y/(1−y)
0
g(pi, λ) dλ
=
∫ 1
0
λg(pi, λ)I(λ) dλ∫ 1
0
g(pi, λ)I(λ) dλ
= E
[
λ
∣∣∣0 ≤ λ ≤ y
1− y
]
where I is the indicator function of λ ∈ [0, y/(1− y)]. The above increases in pi provided
g(pi, λ) obeys the monotone likelihood ratio property, which it does (see §A.6).
A similar proof works for action h, given qh(pi, y)/(1−qh(pi, y)) = E[λ|λ ≥ y/(1−y)].
Convex functions obey a useful tangent property, summarized here (proved in §A.4).
Lemma 7 (Tangents to a Convex Function) Fix 0 ≤ z1 < z2 < z3 < z4 < z5 ≤ 1.
Let τi : R → R be tangent functions to v at zi for i = 1, 2, 4, 5. Then τ1(z3) ≤ τ2(z3)
with strict inequality unless v is affine between z1 and z2, and τ5(z3) ≤ τ4(z3) with strict
inequality unless v is affine between z4 and z5.
We prove in §A.4 that if small information is worthless today, then it is also tomorrow.
But as seen in the next example, the optimization today is simple, and yields a constant
posterior belief threshold. Hence, the information has value today — i.e., strict convexity.
Lemma 8 (Strict Convexity) The value function v is strictly convex on M .
A Two Period Example. While our theory was proven for infinite horizon models,
we illustrate it in a simple closed-form two period example.11 A professor and a student
share a common prior pi, and observe conditionally iid signals σp and σs with common
state-dependent densities fH(σ) = 2σ and fL(σ) = 2(1 − σ). The unconditional density
f(σ) = 1 over private beliefs is uniform (0, 1), and so the induced unconditional density
over log-likelihood ratios is log-concave, and assumption (∗) holds. The professor sees
a signal, and takes an action; his student observes his action, but not his signal. The
professor is totally self-sacrificial: He takes action a ∈ {1, 2} to maximize his student’s
expected payoff alone, where u(2, H) = u(1, L) = 1, u(1, H) = u(2, L) = 0.
11We could have brought finite horizon models under the umbrella of this theory, but it would have
greatly complicated both the notation and the dynamic programming proof, having to deal with both
finite and infinite horizon cases.
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If the student starts with a continuation public belief q, then she will take action 2
exactly when her signal σs ≥ 1 − q. Given the conditional signal densities, her value
function is Vs(q) = (1 − q)
∫ 1−q
0
2(1 − σs)dσs + q
∫ 1
1−q
σsdσs = 1 − q + q2. The professor
obviously employs a threshold rule θ = θ(pi): He chooses 1 if his signal σp < θ, and 2 if
σp ≥ θ. His problem is to maximize V (pi) = EpiVs(q), where q = q(a, pi, θ) is his student’s
public belief (denoted qa later on). Beliefs are a martingale, or pi = E[q|pi], so that
V (pi) = E[Vs(q)|pi] = E(1− q + q2|pi) = 1−E[q|pi] +E[q|pi]2 = 1− pi + pi2 +E[(q − pi)2|pi]
Then the professor’s optimal value exceeds the myopic student value Vs(pi) = 1 − pi + pi2
by the variance of beliefs, which is the value of information. Then
E[(q − pi)2|pi] = pi − q1
q2 − q1 (q2 − pi)
2 +
q2 − pi
q2 − q1 (pi − q1)
2 = (q2 − pi)(pi − q1) (7)
by the martingale property of beliefs, where the two continuation public beliefs are
q1 =
piθ2
piθ2 + (1− pi)(2θ − θ2) and q2 =
pi(1− θ2)
pi(1− θ2) + (1− pi)(1− 2θ + θ2)
Maximizing (7), we find the optimal threshold θ(pi) = (pi − 1 + √pi − pi2)/(2pi − 1) if
pi 6= 1/2, with limit θ(1/2) = 1/2. The posterior belief
r(pi, θ(pi)) =
piθ(pi)
piθ(pi) + (1− pi)(1− θ(pi)) =
1
2
+
1− 2√pi − pi2
2(2pi − 1) ≷ 1/2 as pi ≷ 1/2
This expression is increasing in pi, thus illustrating our contrarianism conclusion. We
observe that the possible signals conveyed by the professor’s action are not ordered by
sufficiency, and so Blackwell’s Theorem does not allow us to compare the value of any two
signals. But intuitively, the professor tries to better communicate the state of the world by
erring on the side of a more equally weighted private signal afforded by the informationally
optimal private belief threshold θ = 1/2 away from the myopic threshold θ = 1−pi. Indeed,
one can easily check that either pi > 1/2, whereupon 1/2 < θ(pi) < 1− pi, or pi < 1/2, and
so 1/2 > θ(pi) > 1− pi. Finally, the professor’s optimal value is easily computed from (7):
V (pi) = 1− pi + pi2 + E[(q − pi)2|pi] = 1− pi + pi2 +
(
2pi(1− pi)
2
√
pi − pi2 + 1
)2
The latter term captures the value of the information conveyed by the professor’s action.
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It measures the excess of the team equilibrium payoff over the herding equilibrium payoff.
It is maximized at pi = 1/2.
4.2 Multiple Actions
The proof of the last subsection avoided considering the cross partial derivative of the
Bellman function in beliefs and thresholds. Instead, we firstly proceeded by considering
just the single partial derivative in the threshold in Step 2, and crucially, we operated at
the optimal threshold. Our attempts to extend this approach have fallen short. With more
than two actions, we proceed with a more traditional approach to a comparative statics
exercise. Our approach will therefore be intuitive, but will necessitate a slightly bolder
assumption about the value function.
A-3 The value function is twice continuously differentiable at the continuation beliefs.
With multiple actions, some may be taken with probability zero (inactive). Posit that:
A-1′ A unique rule x(pi) employing the same set of α > 2 active actions is optimal in an
open neighbourhood N(p¯i) ⊆M of p¯i.
Given the revised assumption A-1′, we excise (and ignore) all inactive actions. Denote
the posterior belief thresholds by y = (y1, . . . , yα−1), with y1 < · · · < yα−1.
We extend the definition of the Bellman maximand to the many-actions setting:
B(pi, y) ≡
α∑
a=1
ψ(a, pi, y) [(1− δ)u¯(a, q(a, pi, y)) + δv(q(a, pi, y))]
We need a traditional comparative statics assumption:
A-4 The matrix of second derivatives Byy(pi, y(pi)) is negative definite for pi ∈ N(p¯i).
Proposition 3 Assume p¯i ∈ M and δ > 0. Under A-1′, A-2, A-3, and A-4, contrarian
behaviour is encouraged: the threshold vector y(pi) strictly increases in pi ∈ N(p¯i).
The first order condition for y is again rewritten
Bya(pi, y) ≡
∂ψ(a, pi, y)
∂ya
[(1− δ)u¯a(ya) + δτa(ya)− (1− δ)u¯a+1(ya)− δτa+1(ya))] (8)
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where τa(y) is the tangent function to v at qa. A marginal change in y affects Bya only
through ya, ya−1 (affecting q(a, pi, y)), and ya+1 (affecting q(a + 1, pi, y)). An increase
in ya−1 will increase q(a, pi, y), and since q(a, pi, y) < ya and v is convex, the tangent
value τ(ya, q(a, pi, y)) will increase. In turn, Byaya−1 ≥ 0 from (8). This supermodularity
property, together with negative definiteness implies that the inverse matrix is nonpositive:
Lemma 9 Let B be a negative definite real matrix with non-negative off-diagonal ele-
ments. Then all entries in B−1 are nonpositive, and strictly negative on the diagonal.
Proof: As the inverse B−1 of a negative definite matrix exists and is negative definite, the
diagonal elements of B−1 are negative. That B−1 ≤ 0 can be concluded from Theorems 2′
and 4 of McKenzie (1960). To keep the presentation self-contained, we offer here an
alternative proof. For any vector z ≥ 0, consider the function F (x, t) = x′Bx + tz′x
where t ∈ R. Note that Fx(x, t) = 2x′B + tz′. Then F is supermodular in x since B has
all non-negative off-diagonal elements. Also, F has increasing differences in (x, t) since
Fxt = z
′ ≥ 0. Since B has full rank, the first order condition 2Bx = −tz has a unique
solution x∗(t). Since Fxx = B is negative definite, x
∗(t) is the unique maximizer of F .
The monotone comparative statics result of Topkis implies that x∗(t) is weakly increasing.
Application of the implicit function theorem to 2Bx + tz = 0 gives x∗t (t) = −(1/2)B−1z.
Since x∗(t) is increasing, B−1z ≤ 0. Since z ≥ 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that B−1 ≤ 0.
To complete the proof of the Proposition, apply the implicit function theorem to
the first order equation By(pi, y(pi)) = 0 to get ypi(pi) = −B−1yy (pi, y(pi))Bpiy(pi, y(pi)). By
Lemma 9, −B−1yy (pi, y(pi)) has all non-negative elements, strictly positive on the diagonal.
Our proof of the single-crossing property extends to show that all elements of the vector
Bpiy(pi, y(pi)) are strictly positive. Thus ypi(pi) has all strictly positive entries.
5 LONG RUN COMPARATIVE STATICS
5.1 Long Run Behaviour in the Optimal Solution
We now ask what happens after an infinite time, which has been the focus of the informa-
tional herding literature. Before developing our more novel result here, the first subsection
below adds patience to the main limit characterization results of SS.
As usual, the belief process converges by the martingale convergence theorem. Not
only must beliefs settle down, but also the planner is never dead wrong about the state.
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Figure 3: Typical value function. Stylized graph of v(pi, δ), δ ≥ 0, with three actions.
Lemma 10 The belief process 〈pin〉 is a martingale unconditional on the state, converging
a.s. to some limiting random variable pi∞. The limit pi∞ is concentrated on (0, 1] in state H.
A proof of this folk result is found in SS. The next result is an expression of EK’s Theorem 5
that the limit belief pi∞ precludes further learning. In the informational herding model,
this is only possible during a cascade, when one action is chosen almost surely, and thus
is uninformative. The next characterization of the stationary points of the stochastic
process of beliefs 〈pin〉 directly generalizes the analysis for δ = 0 in SS. See Figure 3 for an
illustration of how the shape of the optimal value function reflects the cascade sets.
Lemma 11 (Cascade Sets)
(a) For all δ ∈ [0, 1), the support of the limit belief pi∞ is in the sets J1(δ) ∪ · · · ∪ JA(δ).
(b)With unbounded private beliefs, only the extreme cascade sets J1(δ), J1(δ) are nonempty.
(c) If the private beliefs are bounded, then J1(δ) = [0, pi(δ)] and JA(δ) = [p¯i(δ), 1], where
0 < pi(δ) < p¯i(δ) < 1. For large enough δ < 1, all cascade sets disappear except for J1(δ)
and JA(δ), while limδ→1 J1(δ) = {0} and limδ→1 JA(δ) = {1}.
Proof: All but the initial limit belief result are established in the appendix. To see why
that one is true — that a limit cascade must occur, as SS call it — observe that for
any belief pˆi not in any cascade set, at least two signal outcomes (i.e. actions in A) are
realized with positive probability. By the interval structure, the highest such signal is
more likely in state H , and the lowest more likely in state L. So the next period’s belief
differs from pˆi with positive probability. Intuitively, or by the characterization result for
Markov-martingale processes in appendix B of SS, pˆi cannot lie in the support of pi∞. 
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The proof of this result also shows that the larger is δ, the weakly smaller are all cascade
sets: Indeed, this drops out rather easily from the monotonicity of the value function in δ.
We defer asserting this result for now, as Proposition 5 (later) leverages weak monotonicity.
Lemma 12 (Convergence of Beliefs) Consider a solution of the planner’s problem.
(a) For unbounded private beliefs, pi∞ is concentrated on the truth for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
(b) With bounded private beliefs, learning is incomplete for any δ ∈ [0, 1): That is, unless
pi0 ∈ JA(δ), there is positive probability in state H that pi∞ /∈ JA(δ).
(c) With bounded private beliefs, the chance of complete learning (pi∞ ∈ JA(δ) in state H)
tends to 1 as δ ↑ 1.
(d) In the two state informational herding model, if the unconditional log-likelihood ratio
density φ(Λ) is strictly log-concave, then beliefs can never enter a cascade set from outside.
Proof: Part (a) follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11-a,b.
Part (b) follows just as in Theorem 1 of SS. We now extend that proof to establish the
limiting result for δ ↑ 1 in part (c). First, Lemma 11 assures us that for δ close enough
to 1, pi∞ places all weight in J1(δ) and JA(δ). The likelihood ratio Λn ≡ (1 − pin)/pin is
a martingale conditional on state H . Because the likelihood ratio (1 − σ)/σ is bounded
above by some Λ¯ < ∞ for all private beliefs σ, the sequence 〈Λn〉 is bounded above by
Λ¯(1 − pi(δ))/pi(δ), and the mean of Λ∞ must equal its prior mean (1 − pi0)/pi0. Since
limδ→1 pi(δ) = 0, the weight that pi∞ places on J1(δ) in state H must vanish as δ → 1.
For part (d), note that assumption A-2 precludes non-monotonic continuation beliefs,
by Lemma 6. By SS, these are necessary for the existence of nontrivial cascades. 
Part (d) is a contribution about cascade sets quite apart from our contrarianism thrust.
It shows how Lemma 6 in §4 is really an independent result in its own right. The discrete
signal examples of cascades in BHW trivially all violate assumption A-2.
Observe how incomplete learning besets even an extremely patient planner. So this
problem does not fall under the purview of EK’s Theorem 9, where it is shown that if the
optimal value function v is strictly convex in beliefs pi, learning is complete for δ near 1.
For here, the planner optimally behaves myopically for very extreme beliefs: That is,
v(pi) = u¯1(pi) for pi near 0, and v(pi) = u¯A(pi) for pi near 1, both affine functions. This
points to the source of the incomplete learning: lumpy signals (actions, in the herding
model) rather than impatience. It is simply individuals’ inability to properly signal their
private information via a finite action mesh that eventually frustrates the learning process.
We are now positioned to reformulate the learning results of the last section at the
level of actions. For this, we recall that a herd obtains on action a at stage N if all
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individuals n = N,N +1, N +2, . . . choose action a. As SS shows, while a cascade implies
a herd, the converse is false. To show that herds arise, we can generalize the Overturning
Principle of SS to this case: The appendix establishes (in Claim 13) that for beliefs pi near
Ja(δ), actions other than a will push the updated public belief far from its current value.
Thus, convergence of beliefs implies convergence of actions — or, a limit cascade implies
a herd. Since cascade sets are constrained efficient (Lemma 12) and beliefs must converge
(Lemma 12), herding is likewise constrained best (proof appendicized):
Proposition 4 (Herding is Constrained Efficient) Consider any planner’s solution:
(a) An ex post optimal herd eventually starts for δ ∈ [0, 1) and unbounded private beliefs.
(b) With bounded private beliefs, a herd on an action eventually starts. Unless pi0 ∈ JA(δ),
a herd arises on an action other than A with positive chance in state H for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
(c) The chance of an incorrect herd with bounded private beliefs vanishes as δ ↑ 1.
It is no surprise that the planner ends up with full learning with unbounded beliefs, for
this occurs even with selfish individuals (i.e. myopic learning). More interesting is that
the planner optimally incurs the risk of an ever-lasting incorrect herd. Herding is truly a
robust property of the observational learning paradigm.
5.2 Monotonic Cascade Sets
We finally establish a strict limit comparative static: If the planner is indifferent about
learning at some belief (i.e. at the edge of a cascade set), then he strictly prefers to learn
if he is slightly more patient.
Proposition 5 Assume bounded beliefs. All non-empty cascade sets shrink strictly when δ
rises: ∀a ∈ A, if δ2 > δ1 and Ja(δ1) 6= ∅, then Ja(δ2) ⊂ Ja(δ1).
In other words, as individuals grow more patient, the set of cascade beliefs which foreclose
on learning strictly shrinks. In particular, the cascade set is strictly smaller than the
myopically efficient level for even slightly patient individuals. This is an analogue of our
short-run comparative static Proposition 2, since it means that for any positive discount
factor, some individuals should behave in a contrarian fashion, violating the cascade.
However, here no log-concavity assumption is needed.
The proof makes use of two key results, with sufficient independent interest that we
hereby summarize them here (but appendicize their proofs).
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Lemma 13 (Strict Value Monotonicity) The value function increases strictly with δ
outside the cascade sets: for δ2 > δ1, vδ2(pi) > vδ1(pi) for all pi 6∈ J1(δ2) ∪ · · · ∪ JA(δ2).
Intuitively, provided the planner’s strategy in some future eventuality strictly prefers a
non-myopic action, his continuation value must strictly exceed his myopic value. We show
that this holds for any continuation public belief outside both cascade sets Ja(δ1) ⊇ Ja(δ2).
So a more patient player who weights the continuation value more, will enjoy a higher value.
Call two rules equivalent if they are represented by the same thresholds, with the same
associated mixing, if any, at the endpoints. Comparing with Step 1 of §4, we now partially
characterize the differentiability of the value function at the edge of cascade sets.
Lemma 14 (Differentiability) Let pˆi∈(0, 1) be an endpoint of cascade set Ja(δ). If all
rules optimal at pˆi are equivalent, then vδ(·) is differentiable at the belief pˆi.
Since cascade sets do change with the discount factor, we now explain why we proved a
Second Welfare Theorem (Lemma 1) but not a First. For there exists a team equilibrium
which is not optimal. To see why, assume an initial public belief pi ∈ Ja \ Ja(δ). Then
herding on action a is a team equilibrium: Given that everyone subsequent believes that
individual n’s action is uninformative, the best he can do is to maximize his own current
payoff, and when pi ∈ Ja it is myopically optimal to take action a with probability one.
But since pi /∈ Ja(δ), this is not optimal.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper has discovered and explored the fact that informational herding is simply
incomplete learning by a single experimenter, suitably concealed. Our mapping, recasting
everything in rule space, has led us to an equivalent social planner’s problem. In so doing,
we have contributed to the small literature on optimal interval rules. While the revelation
principle in mechanism design also uses such a ‘rule machine’, the exercise is harder for
multi-period, multi-person models with uncertainty, since the planner must respect the
agents’ belief filtrations. While this is trivially achieved in rational expectation price
settings, one must here exploit the public beliefs, and largely invert the model.
Once informational herding is understood as single-person Bayesian experimentation,
it no longer seems so implausible that incorrect herds may be constrained efficient. For
incomplete learning is if anything the hallmark of optimal experimentation models, even
with forward-looking behaviour. This is the setting we then explored.
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The thrust of our paper consists of two strict comparative static results, which formalize
and illustrate the social efficiency of contrarian behaviour in an informational herding
model. First, in the short-run — that is, at any particular finite stage — given a log-
concave log-likelihood ratio density, as an action becomes more popular, individuals should
more strongly lean against taking it on the basis of their private information. This log-
concavity condition is new in information economics. Very loosely, its motivation owes to
the fact that Bayes rule entails a linear aggregation of log-likelihood ratios.
Second, we showed that with a finite action space, informational herding is not in
itself bad, but is in fact a constrained efficient long-run outcome of the social planner’s
problem, and is robust to changing the planner’s discount factor. For any bounded signal
distribution, cascade sets for actions strictly shrink in the discount factor δ < 1. So (i)
for some public beliefs, the team solution calls for violating a myopic cascade, but (ii) the
cascade set never vanishes for any discount factor δ.
Our exploration has hinged crucially on an extension of the Gittins index of the social
present value of each action. This formulation differs from the standard bandit index
because of the agency problem: Since private signals are privately observed, aligning
private and social incentives entails a translation using the marginal social value.
En route to our main results, we have found two useful cases where we can prove
differentiability of the value function in problems of learning. We are aware of no other
examples in the literature of such conditions. We have also found a simple robust condition
under which cascades cannot be entered in two state herding models.
We close with remarks on related literature that has appeared after we first wrote
this paper. Sgroi (2002) proposes that late individuals in the herding model can benefit
from a change in the observational regime, so that the first N individuals cannot see
their predecessors’ actions. This policy is available to the social planner in our model:
Individuals need simply use the myopically optimal threshold x(pi0), where pi0 is the initial
public belief. In general, this special policy is sub-optimal. Doyle (2002) considers the
social planner’s problem in the investment delay problem of Chamley and Gale (1994).
A APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Upper-hemicontinuity: Proof of Lemma 3-(b)
Given the interval structure of Lemma 2, the planner simply determines the chances
ψ(pi, ξδ) of choosing each action, and their order. Represent this by the product of an
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A×A permutation matrix and the vector (ψ(pi, ξδ), a = 1, . . . , A). This choice set is com-
pact in RA
2
. Since the objective function in the Bellman equation (1) is continuous in this
choice matrix and in pi, the claim now follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (e.g.
Theorem I.B.3 of Hildenbrand (1974)). Finally, the map from these matrices to rules is
continuous.
A.2 On the Log-Concavity Assumption
We note that for a twice differentiable signal density f , Assumption A-2 reduces to
f(σ)f ′′(σ)− [f ′(σ)]2
f(σ)2
+
1
σ(1− σ)
[
f ′(σ)
f(σ)
(1− 2σ)− 2
]
≤ 0
This neither implies nor is implied by the common assumption of a log-concave signal
density. It is satisfied if f is log-concave and f ′(σ)/f(σ) ≶ 2/(1− 2σ) for σ ≶ 1/2. Since
f ′(σ)/f(σ) falls in σ for f log-concave, it suffices that f be log-concave and f ′(0)/f(0) ≤ 2
and f ′(1)/f(1) ≥ −2. The canonical family of Beta distributions on [0, 1] with non-
explosive tails satisfies it. The distribution of the log-likelihood ratio is an equally natural
primitive of our model, and admits all well-known log-concave distributions. (See Marshall
and Olkin (1979), §18.B.2.d, for a partial list of the families with log-concave densities.)
Any concavity assumption is defined relative to the additive structure of the variable’s
space, and the log-likelihood ratio space is natural for then Bayes’ rule is additive.
A.3 Marginal and Average Private Signals: Proof of Lemma 5
We prove the first relation — the other is symmetric. Put ψ = piψH + (1− pi)ψL, where
ψω = µω([0, θ]) for the private belief threshold θ = r(1−pi, y). Recalling that dµH/dµ = 2σ
and dµL/dµ = 2(1−σ), we have ∂ψ/∂y = 2f(θ)[piθ+(1−pi)(1−θ)](∂θ/∂y). Differentiating
the quotient q1 = piψ
H/ψ, we find that
ψ
∂q1
∂y
= ψ
∂
∂θ
(
piψH
piψH + (1− pi)ψL
)
∂θ
∂y
=
pi(1− pi)[θψL − (1− θ)ψH ]f(θ)
ψ
∂θ
∂y
Finally, the relation obtains once we see that
(y − q1)∂ψ
∂y
= 2
(
piθ
piθ + (1− pi)(1− θ) −
piψH
ψ
)
f(θ)[piθ + (1− pi)(1− θ)]∂θ
∂y

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A.4 Properties of Convex Functions
Proof of Lemma 7: When v is affine on [z1, z2], tangents τ` and τh coincide, and so τ`(z3) =
τh(z3). Otherwise, the tangents differ, with τh steeper than τ`. Since v is convex, the
tangent at z` lies below v at zh, and so τ`(zh) ≤ v(zh) = τh(zh). Also, τh(z3) − τh(zh) >
τ`(z3)− τ`(zh). Altogether, τ`(z3) < τh(z3). The other case follows similarly. 
Claim 1 (Differentiability) The function B has a well-defined left derivative By−(pi, y)
obeying B(pi, y)− B(pi, y′) = ∫ y
y′
By−(pi, z) dz for y, y
′ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: The only issue are the kinks (if any) of v. Being convex, it is left-differentiable, and
obeys v(qa(pi, y))− v(qa(pi, y′)) =
∫ qa(pi,y)
qa(pi,y′)
v′(q−) dq, by Rockafellar’s Corollary 24.2.1. 
A.5 Strict Convexity: Proof of Lemma 8
Claim 2 The value function is affine on an interval [z1, z2] iff the same contingent strat-
egy is optimal starting from anywhere in that interval.
Proof: The optimal contingent strategy for all the future, starting from any belief pi ∈
[z1, z2], yields some state-dependent values v¯(H) and v¯(L). The line joining the points
(0, v¯(L)) and (1, v¯(H)) is the tangent to v at pi. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the same
contingent strategy is optimal starting anywhere in [z1, z2]. Conversely, holding constant
the contingent strategy for all the future merely adjusts the chances of v¯(H) and v¯(L). 
Claim 3 (An Auxiliary Affine Optimization) Let y∗ ∈ [0, 1] be an optimal posterior
threshold at belief pi ∈ [0, 1], inducing continuation beliefs qa after seeing action a = `, h.
Define the affine function u˜a(y) = (1− δ)u¯a(y)+ δτa(y) for action a = `, h, where τa is the
tangent function to v at qa. Then y ∈ [0, 1] is an optimal posterior threshold belief at pi
if y maximizes
B˜(pi, y) = ψ(pi, y)u˜`(y) + (1− ψ(pi, y))u˜h(y).
Also, y∗ solves maxy∈[0,1] B˜(pi, y).
Proof: Since v is convex, the tangent functions are weakly below v, so all y satisfy
B(pi, y) ≥ B˜(pi, y). Since τa(qa) = v(qa), we also have B˜(pi, y∗) = B(pi, y∗). Thus, if
B˜(pi, y) ≥ (>)B˜(pi, y∗) then B(pi, y) ≥ B˜(pi, y) ≥ (>)B˜(pi, y∗) = B(pi, y∗). 
Proof of Lemma 8: Contrary to strict convexity, assume that v is affine on some
[z1, z2] ⊆ M . By Claim 2, the same contingent strategy, and so first-period rule x, is
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optimal throughout [z1, z2]. Bayes updating after any observation a continuously and
monotonically maps the prior belief interval [z1, z2] into a posterior belief image interval
[q(a, z1, x), q(a, z2, x)]. At this point, the optimal contingent strategy for all the future is
still constant, so that — by Claim 2 — the value function is affine on this image interval.
By Claim 3, at any belief pi ∈ [z1, z2], every solution to maxy∈[0,1] B˜(pi, y) is an optimal
posterior threshold. The problem maxy∈[0,1] B˜(pi, y) can be solved easily ex post: At any
posterior belief ρ, take the action a with the greatest u˜a(ρ), i.e. the same action on one side
of the intersection point y of the affine functions u˜` and u˜h. (Since pi ∈ M , both actions
must be taken, precluding y = 0, 1.) Since the tangent functions at the continuation
beliefs, and thus u˜a, do not depend on pi, the optimal solution is invariant to pi ∈ [z1, z2].
The constant rule x implies a constant private belief threshold θ. But the relation y =
r(pi, θ) uniquely determines pi, and so cannot be satisfied on all of [z1, z2]. Contradiction.
A.6 The Function g
We show that g obeys (1− pi)(1− σ)f(σ)dσ = g(pi, λ)dλ. Since φ(Λ) ≡ f(σ(Λ))σ′(Λ):
(1− pi)(1− σ)f(σ)dσ = (1− pi)(1− σ)φ(Λ(σ(λ)))dΛ
dσ
dσ
dλ
dλ =
pi(1− pi)φ(Λ(σ(λ)))
(pi + λ(1− pi))λ dλ
To see the MLRP Property of g, we show that ∂2 log(g(pi, λ))/(∂λ∂pi) > 0. Indeed,
this inequality holds iff the following has a positive cross partial:
log
φ(Λ(σ(λ)))
(pi + λ(1− pi)) = log φ(Λ(σ(λ)))− log(pi + λ(1− pi))
The second term is clear. As Λ(σ(λ)) = log(σ(λ)/(1− σ(λ))) = log((1− pi)λ/pi), we have
∂
∂λ
log φ(Λ(σ(λ))) =
φ′(Λ(σ(λ))
φ(Λ(σ(λ)))
∂
∂λ
Λ(σ(λ)) =
φ′(log((1− pi)λ/pi))
λφ(log((1− pi)λ/pi))
which is increasing in pi since log((1− pi)λ/pi) is strictly decreasing in pi and since φ′/φ is
a decreasing function, by the log-concavity assumption.
A.7 Cascade Sets: Proof of Lemma 11
Let the Bellman operator Tδ be given by Tδv, equal to the RHS of (1). Note that for v ≥ v′
we have Tδv ≥ Tδv′. As is standard, Tδ is a contraction, and vδ(·) is its unique fixed point
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in the space of bounded, continuous, weakly convex functions.
Let u¯(pi) = maxa u¯a(pi) be the myopic expected utility frontier function.
12
Claim 4 (Iterates and Limit) The sequence {T nδ u¯} consists of pointwise increasing
weakly convex functions that converge to vδ(·). The value vδ(·) weakly exceeds u¯, and
strictly so outside the cascade sets: vδ(pi) > u¯(pi) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1) and ∀pi 6∈ ∪Aa=1Ja(δ).
Proof: To maximize
∑
a∈A ψ(pi, x) [(1− δ)u¯a(q(a, pi, x)) + δu¯(q(a, pi, x))] over x for given
pi, one rule xˆ almost surely chooses the myopically optimal action. Then q(xˆ(σ), pi, xˆ) = pi
a.s., resulting in value u¯(pi). Optimizing over all x ∈ X, Tδu¯(pi) ≥ u¯(pi) for all pi. By
induction, T nδ u¯ ≥ T n−1δ u¯, yielding (as usual) a pointwise increasing sequence converging
to the fixed point vδ(·) ≥ u¯. Finally, when pi is outside the cascade sets, by definition it is
not optimal to almost surely induce one action. So, vδ(pi) > u¯(pi). 
We have not found a published or cited proof of the following folk result.13
Claim 5 (Weak Value Monotonicity) The value function is weakly increasing in δ:
Namely, for δ1 > δ2, vδ1(pi) ≥ vδ2(pi) for all pi.
Proof: Clearly,
∑
a∈A ψ(pi, x)u¯a(q(a, pi, x)) ≤
∑
a∈A ψ(pi, x)v(q(a, pi, x)) for any x and any
function v ≥ u¯. If δ1 > δ2, then Tδ1 u¯ ≥ Tδ2 u¯, since more weight is placed on the larger
component of the RHS of (1). Because one possible policy under δ1 is to choose the ξ
optimal under δ2, we have T
n
δ1
u¯ ≥ T nδ2 u¯. Let n→∞ and apply Claim 4. 
Claim 6 (Weak Inclusion) All cascade sets weakly shrink when δ increases: In other
words, ∀a ∈ A, if 1 > δ1 > δ2 ≥ 0, then Ja(δ1) ⊆ Ja(δ2).
Proof: As seen in Claims 4 and 5, vδ1(pi) ≥ vδ2(pi) ≥ u¯(pi) ≥ u¯a(pi) for all pi, when δ1 > δ2.
For pi ∈ Ja(δ1), we know vδ1(pi) = u¯a(pi) and thus vδ2(pi) = u¯a(pi). The optimal value can
thus be obtained by inducing a a.s., so that pi ∈ Ja(δ2). 
Claim 7 (Unbounded Beliefs) With unbounded private beliefs, the cascade sets for the
extreme actions are J1(δ) = {0} and JA(δ) = {1}. All other cascade sets Ja(δ) are empty.
Proof: SS establish for the myopic model that all Ja(0) are empty, except for J1(0) = {0}
and JA(0) = {1}. Now apply Lemma 4 and Claim 6. 
12Observe how this differs from v0(pi) ≡ supx
∑
a
ψ(pi, x)u¯a(q(a, pi, x)). In other words, v0(pi) allows the
myopic individual to observe one signal σ before obtaining the ex post value u¯(r(pi, σ)). In our example
of §4.1, we have u¯(pi) = max〈pi, 1− pi〉 and v0(pi) = 1− pi + pi2.
13But Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien (1991) do assert without proof (p. 625) that the patient value
function exceeds the myopic one.
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Claim 8 (Bounded Beliefs) If the private beliefs are bounded, then J1(δ) = [0, pi(δ)]
and JA(δ) = [p¯i(δ), 1], where 0 < pi(δ) < p¯i(δ) < 1.
Proof: We prove that for sufficiently low beliefs it is optimal to choose a rule x that
almost surely induces 1; the argument for high beliefs is very similar. Since action 1 is
optimal at belief pi = 0, and is not weakly dominated, it must be the optimal choice for
beliefs pi ≤ p˜i, for some p˜i > 0. Thus, u¯1(pi) = u¯(pi) on [0, p˜i]. Since each u¯a is affine,
u¯1(pi) > u¯a(pi)+ η for all a 6= 1 for some η > 0, and for all beliefs pi in the interval [0, p˜i/2].
No observation a ∈ A can produce a stronger signal than any σ ∈ supp(µ) ⊆ [σ, σ¯] ⊂
(0, 1). So any initial belief pi is updated to at most q¯(pi) = piσ¯/[piσ¯+(1−pi)(1− σ¯)]. For pi
small enough, q¯(pi) ∈ [0, p˜i/2] and q¯(pi)− pi is arbitrarily small, and so is vδ(q¯(pi))− vδ(pi)
small by continuity of v — in particular, less than η(1− δ)/δ for small enough pi. By the
Bellman equation (1), any action a 6= 1 is strictly suboptimal for such small beliefs. 
Claim 9 (Limiting Patience) For large enough δ, all cascade sets disappear except for
J1(δ) and JA(δ), while limδ→1 J1(δ) = {0} and limδ→1 JA(δ) = {1}.
Proof: Fix δ ∈ [0, 1), and an action index a (1 < a < A) for which Ja(δ) = [pi1, pi2], for
some 0 < pi1 ≤ pi2 < 1. Since there are informative private beliefs, ∃σ¯∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) with
1 > µH([σ¯∗, 1]) > µL([σ¯∗, 1]) > 0. We now consider an alternative rule x taking a− 1 and
a when σ respectively lands in intervals Ia−1 = [0, σ¯
∗] and Ia = [σ¯
∗, 1] (see Lemma 2).
Updating the prior pi with the event {σ ∈ [σ¯∗, 1]} results in the posterior belief q(pi) =
piµH((σ¯∗, 1])/[piµH((σ¯∗, 1]) + (1 − pi)µL((σ¯∗, 1])] in state H . For any compact subinterval
I ⊂ (0, 1), in particular one with I ⊇ Ja(δ), there exists ε ≡ ε(I) > 0 with q(pi) − pi ≥ ε
for all pi ∈ I. Thus, q maps the interval [pi2 − ε/2, pi2] into (but not necessarily onto)
[pi2 + ε/2, 1]. Choose γ > 0 so large that u¯a(pi) < u¯a+1(pi) + γ for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Since
vδ(pi) > u¯a(pi) outside Ja(δ) = [pi1, pi2], and both are continuous in pi, we may also choose
η > 0 so small that vδ(pi) > u¯a(pi) + η for all pi ∈ [pi2 + ε/2, 1]. By Claim 5, we thus have
vδ′(pi) > u¯a(pi)+ η for all δ
′ > δ. If δ′ > δ is so large that (1− δ′)u¯ < δ′η, then the Bellman
equation (1) reveals that our suggested rule x beats inducing a a.s. when pi ∈ [pi2−ε/2, pi2].
By iterating this procedure a finite number of times, each time excising length ε/2 from
interval Ja(δ), we see that Ja(δ) evaporates for large enough δ.
If a = 1 or A, apply this procedure repeatedly: Ja(δ) ∩ I vanishes for δ near 1. 
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A.8 Strict Value Monotonicity: Proof of Lemma 13
We first consider a stronger version of Claim 5. Call the private signal distribution 2S
(Two Signals) if its support contains only two isolated points.
Claim 10 (Unreachable Cascade Sets) Fix δ ≥ 0. If 2S fails, then for any pi not
in any δ-cascade set (F): an action a is taken with positive chance inducing a posterior
belief q(a, pi, x) not in any δ-cascade set. If 2S holds, then (F) obtains for all non-cascade
beliefs pi except possibly at most A − 1 points, each the unique belief between any pair of
nonempty cascade sets Ja′(0) and Ja(0) from which both cascade sets can be reached.
Proof: At a non-cascade belief pi, at least two actions are taken with positive chance, and
by the interval structure, some action shifts the public belief upwards while another shifts
it downwards. With unbounded beliefs, q(a, pi, x) never lies in a cascade set; so assume
bounded beliefs. Let co(supp(F )) = [σ, σ¯]. Assume that pi lies between the nonempty
cascade sets Ja′(0) < Ja(0), and let pi = sup Ja′(0) and p¯i = inf Ja(0). By definition of
these cascade sets, r(pi, σ¯) ≤ r(p¯i, σ). If all possible actions at pi led into a cascade set,
then r(pi, σ) ≤ pi and r(pi, σ¯) ≥ p¯i. But these inequalities can only hold with equality since
r(r(pi, σ¯), σ) ≥ r(p¯i, σ) ≥ r(pi, σ¯) ≥ r(r(pi, σ), σ¯) = r(r(pi, σ), σ¯)
and because the outer terms coincide, as Bayes-updating commutes. So, between Ja′(0)
and Ja(0) there exists at most one point pˆi which can satisfy both equations; moreover,
such a point exists iff 2S holds. Indeed, given 2S, we may simply choose pˆi to solve
r(pˆi, σ¯) = p¯i, while if 2S fails, then with positive chance, a nonextreme signal is realized,
and the posterior q is not in a cascade set. With δ > 0 we have weakly smaller cascade
sets by Claim 6 of the Lemma 11 proof, so a pˆi failing (F) is even less likely to exist — in
fact it would further require sup Ja′(δ) = sup Ja′(0) and inf Ja(δ) = inf Ja(0).
Finally, assume 2S. Consider any pˆi with reachable cascade sets Ja′(δ) and Ja(δ). Then
the rule xˆ mapping σ into a′ (low signal to pi) and σ¯ into a (high signal to p¯i) is indeed
optimal. By convexity, vδ(pi) is at most the average of vδ(p¯i) and vδ(pi) (weights given by
transition chances), and xˆ achieves this average. So vδ(·) is affine on (p¯i, pi). 
We now finish proving Lemma 13. By Claim 4 of Lemma 11’s proof, vδ1(pi) > u¯(pi) for
pi outside the δ1-cascade sets. Fix pi outside the δ2-cascade sets. If pi lies in a δ1-cascade
set we’re done, as vδ1(pi) = u¯(pi) < vδ2(pi). Suppose pi lies outside the δ1-cascade sets.
Assume first that pi satisfies (F) of Claim 10 for δ1 (and thus also for δ2). Then at
least one action a is taken with positive chance inducing a belief q(pi, ξδ1(pi), a) not in a
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δ1-cascade set. Thus, vδ1(q(pi, ξ
δ1(pi), a)) > u¯(q(pi, ξδ1(pi), a)). Since δ2 > δ1,
vδ1(pi) = (Tδ1vδ1(·))(pi) < (Tδ2vδ1(·))(pi) ≤ (Tδ2vδ2(·))(pi) = vδ2(pi) (9)
Next assume that some pˆi between Ja′(δ1) and Ja(δ1) fails (F) for δ1. If (9) holds
at pˆi, we are done. Assume not. Claim 10 noted that between consecutive cascade sets
such pˆi must be unique, and that it implied 2S. In that case, (9) holds in a punctured
neighbourhood (pi, pi) ∪ (pi, p¯i) of pˆi, where pi = sup Ja′(δ1) and p¯i = inf Ja(δ1). Also, from
the last paragraph of Claim 10’s proof, vδ1(·) was everywhere an affine function on [pi, p¯i],
which in turn, is a supporting tangent line to the convex function vδ2(·) at pˆi (see Claim 5).
As it touches vδ2(·) at pˆi only, vδ2(pi) > vδ1(pi) and vδ2(p¯i) > vδ1(p¯i).
To find a lower bound to vδ2(pˆi), apply rule xˆ from Claim 10’s proof at the belief pˆi.
Since xˆ maps σ into pi ∈ Ja′(δ1) and σ¯ into p¯i ∈ Ja(δ1), it yields myopic first-period values
u¯a′(pi) = vδ1(pi) and u¯a(p¯i) = vδ1(p¯i), and continuation values vδ2(pi) and vδ2(p¯i). By the
right hand side of (1), this mixture is worth strictly more than vδ1(pˆi):
vδ1(pˆi) = ψ(a
′, pˆi, xˆ)vδ1(pi) + ψ(pˆi, xˆ)vδ1(p¯i)
< ψ(a′, pˆi, xˆ) [(1−δ2)vδ1(pi)+δ2vδ2(pi)] + ψ(pˆi, xˆ) [(1−δ2)vδ1(p¯i)+δ2vδ2(p¯i)]
which is clearly at most vδ2(pˆi). Given this contradiction, (9) must hold at pˆi. 
A.9 Differentiability: Proof of Lemma 14
We proceed in part by establishing claims. Assume that the value v is not differentiable
at pˆi, and that all optimal rules at pˆi are equivalent. We show this leads to a contradiction.
Namely, if all optimal rules at pˆi are equivalent, then v is differentiable at pˆi, as asserted.
Claim 11 ∀ε > 0 ∃η > 0 such that when |pi − pˆi| < η, any optimal rule at pi induces
action a with chance at least 1− ε in states H,L.
Proof: Since pˆi ∈ Ja(δ), one optimal rule at pˆi induces a with chance one. This property
is shared by all rules optimal at pˆi. Next, if ψ(pi, ξδ) = piψ(H, ξδ) + (1− pi)ψ(L, ξδ) is near
1, so are both ψ(H, ξδ) and ψ(L, ξδ). The claim follows from Lemma 3-(b). 
Claim 12 ∀N ∈ N ∀ε > 0 ∃η > 0 so that if |pi − pˆi| < η then under any optimal strategy
from pi, action a is taken for the first N periods with chance at least 1− ε in states H,L.
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Proof: Fix η < 1/2. By Claim 11, for pin near pˆi, action a occurs with chance at least
1−η in each state starting from pin. If a occurs, then pin+1 obeys |pin+1−pin| ≤ 4pˆi(1− pˆi)η,
by Bayes rule. So |pin+1−pin| can be chosen arbitrarily small when a occurs, for pin near pˆi.
Choose the initial pi so close to pˆi that if a occurs for the next N periods, the posterior
stays so close to pˆi that a occurs with conditional chance at least (1 − ε)1/N each period.
Namely, let ρ1 6= pˆi be so close to pˆi that ρ1(1 − ρ1) ≤ 3pˆi(1 − pˆi)/2 and at any pi within
|ρ1 − pˆi| of pˆi, all optimal rules take a with chance at least (1 − ε)1/N in each state. Let
η1 = |ρ1− pˆi| and choose ρ2 6= pˆi within η1/[8pˆi(1− pˆi)] of pˆi and so close to pˆi that a occurs
with chance at least 1 − η1 in each state from any pi within |ρ2 − pˆi| of pˆi. Iterate this to
choose η2 = |ρ2 − pˆi| and then ρ3, and then ρ4, . . . , ρN . If the initial pi lies within |ρN − pˆi|
of pˆi, then it stays within |ρ1− pˆi| of pˆi the next N periods when a occurs in each period.
Finally, we finish the proof of Lemma 14. Any optimal strategy starting at belief pi
yields some state-contingent values v¯L and v¯H . The affine function φ(ρ) through φ(0) = v¯L
and φ(1) = v¯H is then tangent to the value function at pi.
Since it is optimal to take a forever at pˆi, one tangent to v at pˆi is the affine function
h which intersects u(a, L) at pi = 0 and u(a,H) at pi = 1. Consider the left and right
derivatives of v at pˆi, with corresponding tangent lines h1(ρ) and h2(ρ) at belief ρ. One of
those tangents — say, h1 — must differ from h (when h1 differs, necessarily a > 1). Define
vL1 = h1(0) > φ(0) = u(a, L) and v
H
1 = h1(1) < φ(1) = u(a,H). Since u(1, L) ≥ vL1 >
u(a, L), a unique m > 0 exists satisfying vL1 = mu(1, L) + (1−m)u(a, L).
As v is convex, it is differentiable almost everywhere. So let pik ↑ pˆi be a sequence of
beliefs converging up to pˆi, with the value function differentiable at each pik. The tangent
function is then uniquely determined for each pik, and its intercepts at ρ = 0, 1 are the
state-dependent payoffs of any optimal strategy started at pik, namely v
L(pik) ≥ vL1 and
vH(pik) ≤ vH1 . The inequalities of course follow by convexity of v and pik < pˆi.
Now choose N so large and ε so small that m/2 ≥ 1 − (1 − δN)(1 − ε). Note that
action 1 is strictly the best action in state L. Then by Claim 12, for all large enough k,
the expected value vL(pik) in state L of the optimal strategy starting at pik is at most
vL(pik) ≤ (1− δN)(1− ε)u(a, L) + [1− (1− δN)(1− ε)]u(1, L)
≤ (1−m/2)u(a, L) + (m/2)u(1, L)
< (1−m)u(a, L) +mu(1, L) = vL1 ≤ vL(pik)
since u(1, L) > u(a, L), as noted above. Contradiction. 
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A.10 Constrained Efficient Herding: Proof of Proposition 4
Near Ja(δ) we should expect to observe action a. The next lemma states that when other
actions are observed they lead to a drastic revision of beliefs, or there was a non-negligible
probability of observing some other action which would overturn the beliefs.
Claim 13 (Overturning Principle) For δ ∈ [0, 1), assume Ja(δ) 6= ∅. Then there
exists ε > 0 and an ε-neighbourhood K ⊃ Ja(δ), such that ∀pi ∈ K ∩ (0, 1), either:
(a) ψ(pi, ξδ(pi)) ≥ 1− ε, and |q(b, pi, ξδ(pi))− pi|>ε for all b 6= a that occur; or
(b) ψ(pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1− ε, and ψ(pi, ξδ(pi))≥ε/A, |q(a, pi, ξδ(pi))−pi|>ε for some a ∈ A.
Proof: Choose η > 0 small enough such that for any pi sufficiently close to Ja(δ), we
have ψ(b, pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1− η for any b 6= a. If such η does not exist, since the optimal rule
correspondence is u.h.c., almost surely taking action b is optimal at some pˆi ∈ Ja(δ) ⊂ Ja.
This is impossible, as b incurs a strict myopic loss, and captures no information gain.
First, assume bounded private beliefs. By (c) of Lemma 11, for pi close enough to 0 or 1,
the only optimal rule is to stop learning. Thus, we need only consider pi in some closed
subinterval I of (0, 1). Let co(supp(µ)) = [σ, σ¯]. By the existence of informative beliefs,
σ < 1/2 < σ¯. Let ε > 0 be the minimum of η, µH([σ, (2σ+ 1)/4]), and µL([(2σ¯+1)/4, σ¯])
(notice that (2σ + 1)/4 is the midpoint between σ and 1/2).
Assume ψ(pi, ξδ(pi)) ≥ 1− ε for some pi ∈ I. Then any action b 6= a is a.s. only taken
for beliefs within either [σ, (2σ + 1)/4] or [(2σ¯ + 1)/4, σ¯]. Any such b implies case (a)
(selecting, if necessary, ε even smaller).
If instead ψ(pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1 − ε, then each action is taken with chance less than 1 − ε.
By construction of ε, different actions are taken at the two extreme private beliefs (by the
interval structure of the optimal rule). At least one of the A actions occurs with chance
at least ε/A, does not include private beliefs near 1/2, and therefore moves beliefs by at
least ε (selecting, if necessary, ε even smaller), as claimed in case (b).
Next consider unbounded private beliefs. Let the absolute slope of the value function
v have upper bound κ. Since no two payoffs are tied at 0, there exists a small ζ > 0
such that the myopic action payoffs u¯(a, ρ) maintain the same ranking, and the difference
|u¯(a, ρ)− u¯(a′, ρ)| exceeds κζ for all a 6= a′, for all ρ ∈ [0, ζ ].
Assume that pi is near the cascade sets {0} or {1} — say pi near 0. Then only one
aˆ ∈ A can have low continuation belief q(aˆ, pi, ξδ(pi)) ∈ [0, ζ ]. If not, consider the altered
policy that redirects private beliefs from two such actions into the myopically higher of
the two. This yields a first-period payoff gain of more than κζ , and a future value loss of
at most κζ (for q remains in [0, ζ ]). So the altered policy is a strict improvement.
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Assume ψ(1, pi, ξδ(pi)) ≥ 1 − ε. Then aˆ = 1 since q(1, pi, ξδ(pi)) ≤ pi/(1 − ε) ≤ ζ , for
small enough pi and ε. As only action 1 has continuation belief in [0, ζ ], case (a) is satisfied.
Finally, assume ψ(1, pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1− ε. Then ψ(aˆ, pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1− ε. Otherwise, aˆ 6= 1
and a myopic gain of at least (1 − ε)ζ − εU obtains from swapping the private beliefs
for 1 and aˆ, without any change in future value (here U denotes the maximal possible
myopic payoff difference). Thus there is a gain if ε is small enough: contradiction. Since
ψ(aˆ, pi, ξδ(pi)) < 1 − ε there must exist some other action taken with chance at least ε/A
yielding continuation belief outside [0, ζ ]. Thus, case (b) holds. 
For the proof of Proposition 4, we first cite the extended (conditional) Second Borel-
Cantelli Lemma in Corollary 5.29 of Breiman (1968): Let Y1, Y2, . . . be any stochastic
process, and Dn ∈ F(Y1, . . . , Yn), the induced sigma-field. Then almost surely
{ω|ω ∈ Dn infinitely often (i.o.)} = {ω|
∞∑
1
P (Dn+1|Yn, . . . , Y1) =∞}
Fix an optimal policy ξδ. Choose ε > 0 to satisfy Claim 13 for all actions 1, 2, . . . , A.
For fixed a, define events En = {pin is ε-close to Ja(δ)}, Fn = {ψ(pin, ξδ(pin)) < 1− ε}, and
Gn+1 = {|pin+1− pin| > ε}. If En ∩Fn is true, then Claim 13 scenario (b) must obtain, and
so P (Gn+1|pin) ≥ ε/A. Then
∑
∞
n=1 P (Gn+1|pi1, . . . , pin) = ∞ conditional on En ∩ Fn i.o.
By the above Borel-Cantelli Lemma, almost surely Gn obtains i.o. conditional on En ∩Fn
i.o. But since 〈pin〉 almost surely converges by Lemma 10, Gn i.o. is a probability zero
event. By implication, En ∩ Fn i.o. has probability zero.
Consider the event H that 〈pin〉 has a limit in Ja(δ) and En ∩ Fn occurs only finitely
often. By definition, H implies that eventually En ∩ F cn ∩Gcn+1. But En ∩ F cn implies that
every action b 6= a leads to Gn+1, by Claim 13 (a). Action a is then eventually taken on
H . Sum over all a to get a chance one event, by Lemmas 10 and 11. 
A.11 Monotonic Cascade Sets: Proof of Proposition 5
Since Ja(δ2)⊆Ja(δ1) by Claim 6 of §A.7, and Ja(δ1) = {pi|vδ1(pi)− u¯a(pi) = 0} is closed by
continuity of vδ1(pi)− u¯a(pi) in pi, we need only prove p = inf Ja(δ1) /∈Ja(δ2).
Case 1. Assume that at public belief p and with discount factor δ1, some optimal
rule xˆ does not a.s. take action a. Instead, with positive chance, xˆ takes some action b
producing a posterior q(ak, pi, x) not in any δ1-cascade set. [Since a is myopically optimal
at p ∈ Ja(δ1) ⊆ Ja(0), the optimal rule xˆ cannot induce any other myopically suboptimal
action a′ 6= a at a stationary belief.] So from Lemma 13, vδ2(q(b, pi, xˆ)) > vδ1(q(ak, pi, xˆ)) ≥
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u¯k(q(ak, pi, xˆ)), and as we can always employ the rule xˆ with the discount factor δ2,
vδ2(p) ≥
∑
aj∈A
ψ(aj, p, xˆ) [(1− δ2)u¯j(q(aj, p, xˆ)) + δ2vδ2(q(aj, p, xˆ))]
>
∑
aj∈A
ψ(aj, p, xˆ) [(1− δ1)u¯j(q(aj, p, xˆ)) + δ1vδ1(q(aj, p, xˆ))] = vδ1(p)
Consequently, we have vδ2(p) > vδ1(p) = u¯a(p) and so p /∈ Ja(δ2).
Case 2. Next suppose that the optimal rule at public belief p with discount factor
δ1 is unique. Then the partial derivative vδ1(p) exists by Lemma 14. By the convexity
of the value function, any selection from the subdifferential ∂v(pi) converges to vδ1(p)
as pi increases to p. Since the optimal rule correspondence is upper hemicontinuous by
the Maximum Theorem, and uniquely valued at p, the posterior belief q(b, pi, ξδ1(pi)) is
continuous in pi at p for any rule optimal selection ξδ1 and any action b.
Let σ = inf supp(µ) be the lower endpoint of the private belief distribution. As
the optimal rule at p almost surely prescribes action a, we let q(a, p, ξδ1(p)) = p and
q(a′, p, ξδ1(p)) = r(p, σ)[= r]. By their definition, wδ1a (pi, p) and w
δ1
a′ (pi, p) are then jointly
continuous in (pi, p) at (p, σ). [In the expression for wδ1a′ , m
′
a lies between the slopes of
u¯1 and u¯A, and is multiplied by a function that is continuous and vanishing at (p, σ),
given q(a′, p, ξδ1(p)) = r(p, σ).] Also, wδ1a (p, σ) ≥ wδ1a′ (p, σ) since p lies in the cascade
set Ja(δ1), while w
δ1
a (pi, σ) < w
δ1
a′ (pi, σ) for pi < p, since p is the endpoint of Ja(δ1). So
wδ1a (p, σ) = w
δ1
a′ (p, σ) by continuity. This equality can be rewritten in a very useful form:
u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r) = δ1
[
u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r) + vδ1(r)− vδ1(p)−mδ1a (r − p)
]
(10)
Moreover, from the previous proof of Proposition 1, mδ1a is the slope of u¯a, because the
function ha(ρ) = vδ1(p) +m
δ1
a (ρ− p) evaluates the prospect of taking action a forever.
We prove wδ2a (p, σ) < w
δ2
a′ (p, σ), and so conclude p /∈ Ja(δ2). If not, assume wδ2a (p, σ) ≥
wδ2a′ (p, σ), i.e. p = inf Ja(δ2). Subtracting w
δ1
a (p, σ) ≥ wδ1a′ (p, σ), we have the contradiction:
0 ≥ [wδ2a (p, σ)− wδ2a′ (p, σ)]− [wδ1a (p, σ)− wδ1a′ (p, σ)]
= (δ2 − δ1) [u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r)− vδ1(p)] + δ2vδ2(r)− δ1vδ1(r)− δ2mδ2a (r − p) + δ1mδ1a (r − p)
> (δ2 − δ1) [u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r)− vδ1(p)] + δ2vδ1(r)− δ1vδ1(r)− δ2mδ1a (r − p) + δ1mδ1a (r − p)
= (δ2 − δ1)
[
u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r)− vδ1(p) + vδ1(r)−mδ1a (r − p)
]
= (δ2 − δ1) [u¯a(r)− u¯a′(r)] /δ1 ≥ 0
Indeed, when p ∈ Ja(δ1), one optimal policy ξδ1 induces a almost surely at belief p, so that
36
q(a′, p, ξδ1(p)) = q(p, ξδ2(p), a′) = r. The first equality then follows from (2) for each index,
and vδ2(p) = vδ1(p) when p ∈ Ja(δ1) ∩ Ja(δ2). The second exploits mδ1a = mδ2a (true as
both are the slope of u¯a), and vδ2(r) > vδ1(r), as given by Lemma 13. The final inequality
follows since p ∈ Ja(δ1) ⊆ Ja(0), so that a is myopically optimal at r.
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